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Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100010002-2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 22 December 1954

TO : Chief, D/S.

FROM : Chief, S/COM.

SUBJECT: The "Technical" Problem with NSA.

Enclosure: Copy of Memo from Chief, OCI/SIS to AD/OCI.

1. Attached are three copies of a memo concerning the "technical" problem which OCD is having with NSA.

2. It is generally considered that this specific problem is merely another aspect of the general "technical" problem which has been the subject of high-level discussions between CIA and NSA.

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17 December 1954

Assistant Director, Current Intelligence

Chief, Special Intelligence Staff

Present Status of Discussion with NSA on Frequency Usage File

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1. At a meeting in my office attended by OCD, OSI, [REDACTED] and myself, the above subject was discussed. We had before us a draft staff study prepared by OCD on the problem, together with a draft letter from DCI to Canine.

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2. [REDACTED] stated that he had been checking at NSA and had found the following facts:

a. That General Canine had made it quite clear, from the outset of the discussion of the File (about two years ago), that he was determined not to release the information, and had made this attitude clear throughout NSA. [REDACTED] noted that this had not been brought out by the NSA representative during the planning stages.)

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b. That NSA plans to send a formal written refusal to CIA's request, dated 1 July 1954. In this refusal they would state that, with regard to internally used frequencies, they would only be willing to answer specific ad hoc questions. They would refuse to turn over in toto to the Central File the necessary elements from their TEXTA files.

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c. [REDACTED] feels that this refusal is in line with General Canine's policy not to release "technical data." He feels that NSA is determined to prevent anything which they would consider as an inroad upon their jurisdiction to produce COMINT information. They will lay maximum stress on USCIB Directive No. 4. [REDACTED] feels that NSA may be expected to stand by this position, and will only change its position as a result of high level pressure.

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3. [REDACTED] pointed out that there are a number of substantive reasons for CIA to maintain its position,--in addition to the language contained in NSC Action 169, (which obviously prevails over any provision in a USCIB directive). Among the most important are the following:

a. As far as he can determine, NSA does not maintain this material in a form which will enable it to answer questions

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promptly. He suspects that, despite NSA's assurance, unless NSA's material is entirely reorganized, considerable delay will result in practice.

b. The Central File as kept by OCD should be kept currently on as correct a basis as possible. The file receives, from non-COMINT sources, some 18,000 items a month. Unless this material is checked on a day-to-day basis against COMINT information, the amount of work which would be required to answer correctly individual questions might well be staggering. Moreover, the answers to outside clients will be so delayed as to impair the value of the whole operation.

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c. If [REDACTED] has to maintain his file on a collateral basis, he will be forced into the traffic analysis business, since, for example, he would have no way of cancelling out rotating call signs, and they would all appear as separate entries. This would cause tremendous duplication, as well as misleading results. This is precisely the difficulty foreseen by the NSC in paragraph 5 of Action 169.

d. With regard to the "cutout" argument, [REDACTED] of OSI, who participated in the drafting of the NSC action, says, that the use of this term was not intended to mean that the file would be kept in two places, but rather that the Central File would be a means of sanitizing COMINT information.

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e. OCD has been instructed by the NSC to concentrate, at least in the outset, on frequency usage in the Soviet Bloc area. The material from collateral sources on this area is scanty. The result of the NSA position would in effect be that the bulk of the file will be located at NSA--thus Mr. [REDACTED] will be prevented from doing the job which he was told to do as first priority.

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4. In the light of the above considerations, OCD, OSI and ORR will attempt to redraft their staff study, bringing out the above practical arguments, and seeking to answer the arguments of NSA. The study will include a number of practical examples which will show that the NSA plan will not work.

5. When the staff study has been completed on this basis, it is suggested that you may wish to have a meeting with Drs. Chadwell, Guthe, and Andrews, and decide on what, if any, approach should be made to NSA. In this connection, Mr. [REDACTED] has stated that he feels so strongly on this subject that he is prepared to try to take the matter before the NSC if necessary.

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[REDACTED]

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